🛡️ dsh-defend

• 1024 store channel: npm i -g dsh1024 once, then dsh1024 plugin --profile web add dsh-defend (counts toward the deepseek1024.com install ranking).

Prompt-injection, jailbreak, and secret-leak defense for DeepSeek Harness.

Rules decide the known. Interception decides the rest — and everything is audited.

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⭐ 如果它帮到了你

这个插件是 DSH 插件家族的一员（40+ 个，全部 Apache-2.0）。如果你在用，给个 star —— 它不会解锁任何功能，但会让下一个人在搜索里更容易找到它。

English: part of a 40+ plugin family for DeepSeek Harness. If it is useful, a star helps the next person find it — nothing is gated behind it.

Compatibility

Surface	Status
Harness	DeepSeek Harness dsh-v0.1.7-rc.2 (verified 2026-09-25; peer ranges >=0.1.2-rc.1 <0.2.0 || >=0.1.5-alpha.1 <0.2.0 || >=0.1.6-0 <0.2.0 || >=0.1.7-0 <0.2.0). On this line Session.append's third argument exists only for surface-eligible event types and is a SurfaceIntent, so the non-surface defend/detection type still cannot stamp the ignorable marker: session-log audit stays fail-closed-disabled and /defend renders that state explicitly. Session format V4 has no tool-result content block — this plugin never produced one, and its two content walkers keep a read-only fallback for the retired V3 wrapper so sessions written before the upgrade still scan. Verified 2026-09-25 (dual typecheck rulers + full test suite + build + self-contained/artifacts gates + pack; exactly one copy of the host type graph).
Node	^22.19.0 || >=24.0.0
Platforms	All (pure host; no native code, no network)
Model	Any (detection runs before content reaches the model)

What you get

dsh-defend puts two independent layers in front of the agent:

1. Destructive-delete guard — the executable form of the 8·14/8·16 postmortem lesson. On tools/pre-execute, recursively deleting shell commands are refused unless every target is an explicit absolute path inside the session workspace and outside the protected prefixes (home config, .dsh/.claude, system directories). Dry-run markers (-WhatIf, --dry-run, git clean -n) pass, because they are exactly the check the lesson demands.
2. Detection layer — ported from four upstream assets (all Apache-2.0, see THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md): 25 Prompt-Injection-Payloads rules, 25 Jailbreak-Detector patterns through a pure-TypeScript Aho-Corasick automaton, 12 secret grammars from Secret-Key-Leaker-Detect plus the issuers' public references, and the Prompt-Attack-Dataset kept verbatim as the regression benchmark.

Three interception points, one decision model each:

Point	Scanned	Decision
agent/pre-step	inbound user messages	allow → next(); ask → approval; block → reject the step
tools/pre-execute	tool arguments	allow → next(); ask → approval; block → deny
tools/post-execute	tool results	allow → next(); ask → approval; block → corrective feedback

Defaults: ask for every family, block for critical secrets (the upstream interrupt-on-sight semantics). No approval answerer = fail closed. Every pass-through calls next() — downstream policy plugins are never short-circuited.

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